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E-WASTE & THE REGULATORY
COMMONS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE
DECENTRALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
INTRODUCTION

I

n an isolated junkyard at the edges of Lagos, Nigeria, hundreds of laborers, including young children, pick apart
remnants of discarded electronics to recover valuable minerals
such as gold and copper. Unaware of the dangerous carcinogens
and harmful chemicals that abound in the electronic waste (“ewaste”),1 these workers often burn the e-waste in open air and
further expose themselves to extremely toxic materials.2 Today,
increasing demand for the latest technologies drives the fastest
growing, and potentially most dangerous, waste stream worldwide.3 Developing countries are the most common destinations

1. Electronic components contain small quantities of precious metals such
as gold and copper. JIM PUCKETT ET AL., EXPORTING HARM: THE HIGH-TECH
TRASHING OF ASIA 8 (Jim Puckett & Ted Smith eds., 2002), available at
http://www.ban.org/E-waste/technotrashfinalcomp.pdf.
2. Studies indicate that the bodies of those who live near these e-waste
dumps have the highest amount of cancer-causing dioxins in the world. See
Janet K.Y. Chan et al., Body Loadings and Health Risk Assessment of Polychlorinated Dibenzo-p-dioxins and Dibenzofurans at an Intensive Electronic
Waste Recycling Site in China, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 7668, 7672 (2007) (noting that breast milk of women who worked in electronic waste recycling centers had more than two times the concentration of dioxins than do women
working in a control site and that their placentas had nearly three times the
concentration of dioxin than do women at the control site).
3. Christian Purefoy, Serious Contamination Threat from Africa’s Mount(Apr.
9,
2009),
ing
E-Waste,
CNN
NEWS
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/08/africa.recycling.computers.ew
aste/index.html. More recent projections by the United Nations’ Solving the
E-Waste Problem Initiative (“StEP”) estimate global e-waste volumes to grow
by 33% in the next four years, making e-waste the world’s fastest growing
waste stream. John Vidal, Toxic “E-Waste” Dumped in Poor Nations, says
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
14,
2013),
United
Nations,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/14/toxic-ewasteillegal-dumping-developing-countries.
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for these wastes.4 For instance, the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”)5 reports that African countries are
quickly becoming the final destination for the world’s e-waste.6
Usually this waste is broken apart and burned by young boys
in countries like China.7 A 2007 study found that blood lead
levels of children in Guiyu, China were 50% higher than the
maximum safe exposure set by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in the United States.8
Electronics represent the world’s largest and fastest growing
manufacturing industry,9 and the exponentially growing pace
of consumer demand for new gadgets fuels the growth in ewaste. This waste includes electronic devices such as computers, mobile phones, television sets, entertainment devices, and
refrigerators.10 Additionally, any components of these products,
4. Vidal, supra note 3.
5. The UNEP was created in 1972 at the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment to serve as the “focal point for environmental action and coordination” among United Nations members. Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Cooperation, G.A. Res. 2997, pt. II, para. 1, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No.
30, U.N. Doc. A/8730, at 43 (Dec. 15, 1972). “The UNEP promote[s] international cooperation in the field of the environment.” United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, Agenda 21 – Chapter 38, part 22, 388.
6. James Simpson, Toxics Alert: Africa Emerging as E-Waste Dumping
Ground, TOXICS ALERT (Dec. 2006), http://enews.toxicslink.org/newsview.php?id=3 (“According to a study by the Basel Action Network (“BAN”), a
minimum of 100,000 used and obsolete computers a month are entering the
Nigerian port of Lagos alone.”).
(Jan.
08,
2009),
7. Bryan
Walsh,
E-Waste
Not,
TIME
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1870485,00.html.
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1044, ELECTRONIC WASTE:
EPA NEEDS TO BETTER CONTROL HARMFUL U.S. EXPORTS THROUGH STRONGER
ENFORCEMENT AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION (Aug. 2008), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279792.pdf.
9. See JIM PUCKETT ET AL., THE DIGITAL DUMP: EXPORTING RE-USE AND
ABUSE TO AFRICA 7 (Jim Puckett ed., 2005), available at
http://www.ban.org/library/TheDigitalDump.pdf [hereinafter THE DIGITAL
DUMP]. BAN produced this film and report to document, and increase awareness of, the harmful effects of e-waste dumping in Africa.
10. Pakistan: Environment: The Dark Side of Digital Waste, THE FRIDAY
TIMES (Pak.), May 16, 2010, [hereinafter THE FRIDAY TIMES]; See also What is
E-Waste?, CAL. DEP’T OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY,
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Electronics/WhatisEwaste/ (last updated Oct. 26,
2012) (stating that the definition of e-waste comprises mobile phones, computers, televisions, batteries, light bulbs, printers, and consumer electronics.
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including cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”),11 circuit boards, and ink
cartridges, which are “sold, obsolete, broken or discarded by
their original owners,” are also considered e-waste.12 As a result of the rapid pace of innovation and the related issue of
product obsolescence, e-waste is one of the fastest growing
types of waste in the industrialized world.13 In fact, the United
Nations projects global e-waste volumes will grow from 48.9
million metric tons in 2012 to 65.4 million metric tons in 2017,
or “the weight equivalent of 200 Empire State Buildings or 11
Great Pyramids of Giza.”14 Yet consumers who choose to refurbish or recycle their unwanted electronics often must spend
large sums of money or make long trips to designated recycling
centers,15 and often have few affordable and accessible disposal
options for electronic waste.16
As this Note will discuss, in addition to the Basel Convention
on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
There is, however, no legal definition for e-waste. For example, California has
not been able to determine if certain items, like microwave ovens and similar
appliances like toaster ovens or blenders, should be considered e-waste).
11. CRTs refer to the video display components of older non-flat screen
televisions and computer monitors. They contain glass tubes made with
harmful levels of lead and barium. See, Fact Sheet: Easier Recycling of CathPROTECTION
AGENCY,
ode
Ray
Tubes,
U.S.
ENVTL.
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/recycling/electron/crt-fs06.htm (last updated
Nov. 15, 2012); see also Jennifer Kutz, You’ve Got Waste: The Exponentially
Escalating Problem of Hazardous E-Waste, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308
(2006).
12. See CAL. DEP’T OF RESOURCES RECYCLING AND RECOVERY, supra note 10.
13. Betsy M. Billinghurst, E-Waste: A Comparative Analysis of Current
and Contemplated Management Efforts by the European Union and the United States, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 399, 400 (2005).
14. Allie Bidwell, U.N. Seeks to Solve Growing Global E-Waste Problem,
&
WORLD
REPORT
(Dec.
16,
2013),
U.S.
NEWS
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/16/un-seeks-to-solve-growingglobal-e-waste-problem. A report by the Electronics Takeback Coalition
states that the 2009 digital conversion of analog televisions in the United
States will continue to contribute to e-waste production, because analog televisions are no longer desirable for consumers’ reuse. In the United States
alone, consumers dispose of more than 550,000 computers and mobile devices
per day, based on the EPA’s 2010 findings. Facts and Figures on E-Waste and
Recycling, ELECTRONICS TAKEBACK COALITION 6 (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.electronicstakeback.com/wpcontent/uploads/Facts_and_Figures_o
n_EWaste_and_Recycling.pdf.
15. See Billinghurst, supra note 13, at 400.
16. Id.
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their Disposal of 1989 (“Basel Convention”)17 and the proposed
Basel Ban Amendment,18 the promulgation of various regulations to manage e-waste—such as the European Union’s Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE”) Directive19 and
the Directive on the Restriction of the Use of Hazardous Substances (“RoHS”),20 as well as the United States’ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 21—has done little to address the growing e-waste problem or the loopholes associated
with the Basel Convention.22 The Basel Convention also conflicts with international trade law as enforced by the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”).23 Despite various efforts to regulate e-waste disposal, the proliferation of legislation has yielded
unsatisfactory outcomes and has even created adverse effects.24
Examined together, the inefficiencies of e-waste regulation exemplify the findings of the “regulatory commons” as described
by Professor William Buzbee. 25 These inefficiencies can be
overcome by shifting the burden of regulation from weak international entities to more authoritative private actors through

17. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
18. The Basel Convention Ban Amendment, BASEL CONVENTION,
http://www.basel.int/pub/baselban.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Basel Ban Amendment].
19. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN., WEEE: Waste
EXPORT.GOV,
Electrical
and
Electronic
Equipment,
http://export.gov/europeanunion/weeerohs/weeeinformation/index.asp
(last
updated May 16, 2013).
20. See Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L 37), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0095:en:HTML
[hereinafter Directive 2002/95/EC].
21. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976).
22. See generally Christine Terada, Recycling Electronic Wastes in Nigeria:
Putting Environmental and Human Rights at Risk, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 154 (2012).
23. See generally Tanya Karina A. Lat, Testing the Limits of GATT Art.
XX(b): Toxic Waste Trade, Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements, and the
WTO, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367 (2009).
24. Terada, supra note 22.
25. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
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democratic experimentation analogous to Japan’s Specified
Home Appliance Recycling Law (“SHAR”).26
The regulatory commons is a reinterpretation of the classic
paradox of the tragedy of the commons,27 in which a natural
resource is exploited due to lack of regulation and accountability; in the regulatory commons, however, regulation itself is the
overexploited resource.28 Overregulation poses regulatory challenges and, ironically, gives rise to decentralization mechanisms that actually enable more effective regulation.29 The coexistence of multiple forms of regulation often produces problems, including “jurisdictional mismatch” 30 and “regulatory
fragmentation.” 31 Furthermore, in contrast to the tragedy of
the commons, in the regulatory commons there is rarely a single government regulator. 32 Applying the framework of the
26. Japan implemented The Home Appliance Recycling Act in 2001 and it
is known by the acronym “SHAR” because it was originally named the “Specified Home Appliance Recycling Law.” Catherine K. Lin, Linan Yan & Andrew
N. Davis, Globalization, Extended Producer Responsibility and the Problem of
Discarded Computers in China: An Exploratory Proposal for Environmental
Protection, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 525, 541-42 (2002).
27. The tragedy of the commons is commonly used to characterize environmental resource management problems, as first put forth in Garrett Hardin’s seminal paper. In the classic tragedy of the commons, each private actor, for example, as a fisherman, has an incentive to catch as many fish as
possible. The unchecked pursuit of self-interest, however, under circumstances where a given resource (e.g., fish) is finite, leads to overexploitation of the
resource. Over time, resource extraction (e.g., fishing) exceeds the reproduction and replacement rates, which in turn leads to the depletion of fish stocks
and the ultimate failure of fishing businesses. Hardin proposes that private
property rights in a resource help actors avoid such market failure because
property rights incentivize the holders of those rights to manage the resource
sustainably, leading to optimal, long-term productivity of the resource. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
28. Buzbee, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE
ESSAY ON THE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR
POLLUTION, 1940-1975 (1977) (explaining that the lack of a prime or traditional regulator leads to political inattention and duplication of regulation).
See also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1538 (1999) (noting that jurisdictional mismatches exist
between the breadth of government authorities’ reach and the scope of public
goods they deliver).
31. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 701-04 (1999).
32. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 9.
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regulatory commons, this Note proposes that in the context of
the growing e-waste stream, decentralization, while counterintuitive at first glance, is a better approach to effectively promoting human and environmental health because it capitalizes
on solutions inherent in the regulatory commons.
Part I provides an overview of e-waste, its harmful effects on
the developing world, the backdrop for e-waste regulation, and
the weaknesses of e-waste regulation as embodied in the Basel
Convention, the proposed Basel Ban Amendment, the WEEE
and RoHS Directives in the European Union, and RCRA in the
United States. Part II presents the paradox of the regulatory
commons, a twist on the classic model of the tragedy of the
commons, by showing that the regulatory opportunity is the
overregulated resource. Part II then applies this paradox to existing e-waste regulations, including the Basel Convention, the
proposed Basel Ban Amendment, the WEEE and RoHS Directives, and RCRA, as well as potential conflicts with the WTO’s
trade regulation, and discusses how the proliferation of these
regulations manifests problems of the regulatory commons. Finally, Part III proposes ways in which international environmental laws can be decentralized to reconcile the regulatory
commons paradox and more effectively regulate e-waste.
I. BACKGROUND OF E-WASTE AND ITS REGULATION
A. Harmful Effects of E-Waste on the Developing World
E-waste poses significant risk to humans and the environment.33 It consists of recyclable materials, such as plastics and
aluminum,34 as well as many toxic organic pollutants known as
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). This class of pollutants includes copper, gold, iron, lead, thallium, and zinc, all of which
can lead to birth defects.35 The CRTs in computer and TV mon33. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10.
34. JOHN GALLAUGHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO
HARNESSING
TECHNOLOGY
§
5.8
(2010),
available
at
http://www.flatworldknowledge.com/pub/information-systems-managersg/2374/73228.
35. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10. See also JOSEPH F. C. DIMENTO, THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2003) (citing a notorious
anecdote in 1988 involving a shipment from Italy of 18,000 drums of waste,
including PCBs and asbestos, to an “unscrupulous businessman” in Koko,
Nigeria, which led to so many hospitalizations and premature births that
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itors also contain lead, leading to the serious consequence of
lead poisoning.36 Additionally, many electronics contain cadmium, which is a carcinogen,37 and mercury, which, in large doses, can cause neurological disorders. 38 Furthermore, plastic
parts often contain toxic flame retardants.39 A common method
of taking apart e-waste is to burn electronic equipment in an
open fire in order to melt away plastics and inexpensive metals.40 Many disposal methods, including burning, unleash dangerous carcinogens and neurotoxins, pollute water supplies,
and lead to allergic reactions, not limited to skin and respiratory tract disorders. 41 The methods used in the disposal of ewaste also release pollutants, such as black soot, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, into the atmosphere.42 Moreover, ewaste lying undisturbed in landfills can be just as harmful because it contains heavy metals such as copper, lead, and mer-

Nigeria subsequently banned the importation of hazardous wastes and implemented the death penalty for violations).
36. Approximately 75% of all CRTs disposed of in the United States are
exported for refurbishing, but only approximately 30% are actually appropriate for such refurbishing; the remainder of the CRTs are dumped. MADELEINE
COBBING, TOXIC TECH: NOT IN OUR BACKYARD, UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN FLOWS
OF
E-WASTE,
47
(2008),
available
at
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet2/report/2008/2/not-in-our-backyard-summary.pdf. See also Childhood Lead
Poisoning, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/lead
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (noting that lead poisoning results in serious harm
to nearly every bodily system, as well as learning disabilities, behavioral
problems, and even seizures, coma, and death).
37. Cadmium Compounds Hazard Summary, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/cadmium.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2007).
38. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: POTENTIAL EXPORT OF MERCURY
COMPOUNDS FROM THE U.S. FOR CONVERSION TO ELEMENTAL MERCURY, ix
(2009),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/pdfs/mercury-rpt-tocongress.pdf.
39. See SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, Just Say No to E-Waste: Background Document on Hazards and Waste from Computers, U. ARK.,
http://cmase.uark.edu/teacher/Environmental_Ed/2006%20EWaste%20Info/E-Waste/Just%20Say%20No%20-%20EWaste%20Backgrounder.pdf (last updated Jun. 9, 2006).
40. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10.
41. Id.
42. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste in Pakistan Are a Goldmine, GREEN
PROPHET, (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.greenprophet.com/2011/10/pakistan-ewaste-goldmine/ [hereinafter Mountains of Toxic E-Waste].
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cury, which can leach into the soil and groundwater over
time.43
Developed countries have strict regulations that seek to curb
e-waste’s damage within their borders, often dumping them in
developing countries, which disproportionately bear the toll
that e-waste inflicts on environmental and human health. 44
Although a number of Western countries have banned disposing of old computers in landfill sites and have required that
they be recycled, recycling can cost “tens of dollars per computer.”45 For many developed countries, the more cost-effective alternative is to export old electronics to developing countries,
where regulations on e-waste are either nonexistent or neglected.46 In Europe, for example, only one third of e-waste is treated in compliance with the WEEE Directive.47 Exporters often
disguise illegal e-waste as “secondhand goods” and “for charities” to developing countries in Africa.48 As a result, China, India, and African countries, which can provide cheap labor and
adhere to less stringent environmental laws, or lack such environmental laws entirely, are the end destinations for e-waste.49
Thus, the same countries regulating e-waste are also often the
ones illegally exporting e-waste to the developing world.50 Nevertheless, developing countries have embraced e-waste recy43. THE FRIDAY TIMES, supra note 10.
44. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42.
45. Richard Black, E-Waste Rules Still Being Flouted, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3549763.stm. (last updated Mar. 19, 2004).
46. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42. See also Black, supra note
45.
47. Jana Viktoria Nysten, EU Regulation of Electronic Waste: A Revised
Directive Reflects Economic and Environmental Concerns, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION:
TRENDS
(Sept.
/
Oct.
2012),
www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2012_13/september_october/eu_reg
ulation_electronic_waste_revised_directive_reflects_economic_and_environment
al_concerns.html.
48. Where Does E-Waste End Up?, GREENPEACE (Feb. 24, 2009),
www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/toxics/electronics/the-ewaste-problem/where-does-e-waste-end-up/.
49. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42.
50. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, WHERE ARE WEEE IN AFRICA?
FINDINGS FROM THE BASEL CONVENTION E-WASTE AFRICA PROGRAMME, 12 (Dec.
2011),
available
at
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/TechnicalAssistance/EWaste/EwasteAfr
icaProject/Publications/tabid/2553/Default.aspx.

2014]

E-WASTE

1259

cling for its employment opportunities and the potential to recover economic value from precious metals such as copper, gold,
silver, indium, and palladium.51
B.

Global E-Waste Regulations: An Overview

The Basel Convention presents the foundation for international regulation of the movement of hazardous waste from industrialized to developing countries. 52 The Basel Convention
sets forth three primary goals: 1) the minimization of hazardous waste (“waste reduction principle”), 2) the disposal of waste
close to its source of origin (“proximity principle”), and 3) the
decrease of transboundary movement of waste.53 In an effort to
achieve these goals, the Basel Convention establishes six rules.
First, waste is a “bad,” as opposed to a usable and tradable
good, that harms human and environmental health and thus
should not be traded.54 Second, waste must be minimized at its
source and disposed of in the state where it was created. 55
Third, developed countries that originally generated the waste
must manage its disposal in a more acceptable fashion and
must only export waste to other countries when it is for recycling and upon the prior, informed consent of the importing

51. Mountains of Toxic E-Waste, supra note 42.
52. Basel Convention, supra note 17. See also Nicola J. Templeton, The
Dark Side of Recycling and Reusing Electronics: Is Washington’s E-Cycle Program Adequate?, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 766-68 (2009).
CONVENTION,
53. About
the
Convention,
BASEL
http://www.basel.int/convention/basics.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). The
Basel Convention identifies waste either by its place of disposal or by its recovery process. Annexure IV of the Convention lists these various recovery
processes. For example, almost all materials recycled or processed in order to
recapture a metal, or an organic or inorganic substance for future use, are
listed as waste. On the other hand, electronic components that can be used
without further processing are not generally defined as waste. The Basel
Convention further divides waste into two lists: List A in Annexure VII for
“hazardous” waste that “poses serious threats to the environment and human
health” and that requires “special handling and disposal processes,” and List
B in Annexure IX for non-hazardous waste, which is not regulated by the
Basel Convention. Most e-waste is categorized under List A and is subject to
the Basel Convention.
54. TOXICS LINK, E-WASTE IN INDIA: SYSTEM FAILURE IMMINENT-TAKE
ACTION
NOW!
(2004),
available
at
http://www.toxicslink.org/docs/06040_repsumry.pdf.
55. Basel Convention, supra note 17, art. 4.
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country. 56 Fourth, the Basel Convention acknowledges that
countries have a “sovereign right” to ban the import, entry, or
disposal of hazardous wastes. 57 Fifth, the Basel Convention
bans trade between parties to the convention and nonparties.58
Sixth, the Basel Convention bans export of hazardous wastes to
those member states whose domestic laws prohibit the import
of hazardous wastes.59
Despite the Basel Convention’s noble goals, various parties
stand to benefit economically from e-waste trade that violates
the Basel Convention.60 For example, importers, traders, and
recyclers have continued to exploit loopholes in the Basel Convention under pretexts of e-waste disposal for recycling or reuse. E-waste recycling is often profitable to importers because
electronic equipment contains small quantities of valuable materials such as gold and copper that can be extracted, reclaimed, and then resold.61 In fact, the Basel Action Network
(“BAN”), a nonprofit group named after the Basel Convention
and focusing on combating toxic waste, estimates that as much
as 99% of the waste that is shipped to developing countries is to
be recycled or reused.62 At the same time, developing countries
lack the infrastructure needed to track the e-waste or oversee
handling. 63 Furthermore, people are often uninformed of the
procedure to report a claim to international authorities such as
Interpol and to take action against e-waste that is disposed of
56. Id. arts. 4, 6.
57. Id. preamble.
58. Id. art. 4.5.
59. Id. art. 4.1.(a). The Basel Convention does, however, permit transboundary movement of hazardous waste if the country of origin is unable to
safely dispose of it. Id. art. 4.9.(a).
60. See Jerrold A. Long, Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 253, 254-55 (1999). For
instance, the Basel Convention does not hold exporters liable for damages
occurring after the importer received “operational control” of the waste. Consequently, countries lack incentive to ensure that facilities exist in the importing country, so that importing countries disproportionately bear the costs
of enforcement.
61. Vinutha V., The E-Waste Problem, EXPRESS COMPUTER ONLINE (Nov.
21,
2005),
http://computer.financialexpress.com/20051121/management01.shtml.
62. Charles W. Schmidt, Environmental Crimes: Profiting at the Earth’s
Expense, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 96, 101 (2004).
63. Id. at 102.
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illegally.64 When authorities are unable or unwilling to oversee
the waste and monitor illegal dumping, e-waste is dumped as
an afterthought.65 Therefore, countries like China, India, and
Pakistan continue to be the primary dumping grounds for ewaste from industrialized countries.66
In 1995 developing countries sought to overcome the Basel
Convention’s loopholes in connection with recycling and reuse
through the Basel Ban Amendment, which seeks to ban the export of all hazardous wastes from the twenty-nine “Annex VII
countries” (Basel Convention signatories that also belong to the
European Union or to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”))67 to the non-Annex VII
countries (all other signatories to the Basel Convention). 68 If
implemented, the Basel Ban Amendment would ensure that
developed countries keep e-waste within their own borders, and
would effectively shift the burden from developing countries—
to turn away imports of hazardous wastes—to industrialized
countries—to prevent such exports.69 Nevertheless, the Basel
Ban Amendment has not taken effect because it has not yet
met the Basel Convention’s requirement for ratification by
three-fourths of Basel Convention parties.70 In fact, when the
Basel Ban Amendment was proposed, Greenpeace, a leading
non-governmental organization dedicated to environmental
protection, labeled several developed countries the “sinister
seven” for they were key opponents of the Basel Ban Amendment.71 Against this backdrop of the failures of the Basel Con64. Id. at 98.
65. Id. at 98.
66. Vinutha, supra note 61.
67. The OECD is a coalition of thirty-two countries focused on democracy
and the free market. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
68. Basel Ban Amendment, supra note 18.
69. Id.
70. The Basel Ban Amendment requires sixty-six country ratifications,
representing three-fourths of the eighty-seven parties present at the Third
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, to take effect. Despite the fifty-one
ratifications, the issue as to when the Basel Ban Amendment shall enter into
force remains controversial. Ban Ratification Deposit Box, BASEL ACTION
NETWORK, http://www.ban.org/deposit-box/ (last updated Mar. 27, 2013).
71. These countries are: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Jim Puckett & Cathy Fogel, A Victory for Environment and Justice: The Basel Ban and How it Hap-
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vention, global regulations have proliferated and aim to tackle
e-waste disposal. These additional regulations, however, actually exacerbate the problem by fostering the exploitation of a
resource, namely regulation itself. This exploitation is manifested by the paradox of the regulatory commons.
The EU’s enactment of the WEEE Directive in January 2003
represents the first significant producer takeback, or Extended
Producer Responsibility (“EPR”), program,72 along with the recent WEEE Recast Directive in July 2012. 73 Both measures,
however, fall short of achieving their intended goals. The
WEEE Directive mandates that private sector producers fund
and coordinate collection facilities for consumers to properly
dispose of or recycle e-waste at no cost to the consumer.74 On its
face, the WEEE Directive is a blanket regulation covering all ewaste, regardless of its source or quantity.75 Ideally, the WEEE
Directive would shift the entire burden of e-waste recycling and
disposal to the original producers and compel manufacturers,
retailers, consumers, waste operators, and the government to
participate in all steps of the waste recovery process.76 Addipened,
BASEL
ACTION
NETWORK
(1994),
http://ban.org/about_basel_ban/a_victory.html.
72. EPR places the onus on producers to provide for the long-term environmental responsibility of their products in a “cradle-to-grave” chain, from
production to distribution to recycling, reuse, and sustainable product design.
Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
53, 53, 65-69 (2006). Before 2003, the EU’s e-waste management landscape
was similar to the present situation in the United States, in that there was
no comprehensive e-waste policy, although some EU countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany (e.g. Packaging Ordinance legislation enacted in
1991), Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden had such manufacturer
takeback policies before 2003.
73. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN., WEEE: Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment, supra note 19.
74. See Council Directive 2002/96, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 37) 24-25 (EC),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32002L0096; Kutz, supra note 11, at 321;
Phoenix Pak, Haste Makes E-Waste: A Comparative Analysis of How the U.S.
Should Approach the Growing E-Waste Threat, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 241, 271 (2008).
75. See Sachs, supra note 72, at 77 (discussing how the WEEE Directive
mandates that manufacturers take back all household appliances and electric
tools, among other wastes).
76. See Promoting and Practicing Environmental Stewardship for ElecENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
tronic
Products,
U.S.
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tionally, the WEEE Recast Directive seeks to expand the scope
of the original WEEE Directive, strengthen takeback programs,
increase EU member states’ waste collection rates, and streamline registration and reporting requirements, among other
goals.77 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the WEEE Directive
and the WEEE Recast Directive are undermined by inconsistencies.78
The European Union also sought to structure the WEEE Directive to create ways for manufacturers to develop more environmentally friendly electronics and implemented the RoHS
Directive in February 2003, in tandem with the WEEE Directive, to ensure that hazardous materials are removed from
electronic devices.79 The RoHS Directive mandated that manufacturers cease using six substances in electronic goods sold
within the European Union by 2006: lead, mercury, cadmium,
hexavalent chromium, polybrominated bi-phenyls, and
polybrominated diphenyl ethers.80 Similarly to the WEEE Dihttp://www.epa.gov/wastes/conserve/tools/stewardship/products/electronics.ht
m (last updated June 28, 2013); Rob Courtney, Evolving Hazardous Waste
Policy for the Digital Era, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 199, 216 (2006).
77. In particular, the WEEE Recast Directive provides a transition period,
from August 13, 2012 to August 14, 2018, to expand the scope of the WEEE
Directive to all electrical and electronic equipment. The WEEE Recast Directive also requires distributors to set up collection stations at retail locations at no charge to end-users, and sets a target for a minimum collection
rate of 45% starting in 2016 to 65% in 2019. New Recast WEEE Directive
(2012/19/EU)
Published,
INTERTEK,
http://www.intertek.com/consumer/news/v110-new-recast-weee-directive/
(last visited April 9, 2014); See also U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
supra note 73.
78. See Pak, supra note 74, at 262.
79. Catherine Day, Frequently Asked Questions on Directive 2002/95/EC
on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical
and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) and Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORGENERAL ENV’T, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/faq_weee.pdf
(last updated Aug. 2006); See Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note 20.
80. The RoHS Directive banned the use of these six substances by both
manufacturers within the European Union and manufacturers who imported
electronic goods into the EU. The RoHS Directive, however, allows exceptions
for the use of the six banned substances when it is “technically or scientifically impracticable” to replace the banned substance with a substitute or when
the use of a substitute would result in “negative environmental, health and/or
consumer safety impacts” likely to outweigh any benefits derived from the
ban. For instance, the RoHS Directive makes exceptions for the use of lead in
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rective, the EU recast the RoHS Directive (“RoHS II”)81 and expanded the scope of the original RoHS Directive to all electronic equipment, cables, and spare parts by 2019.82 In effect, RoHS
II seeks to establish “improvements in implementation, enforcement and coherence.”83 Although most electronics manufacturers have been able to modify products to satisfy the RoHS
Directive,84 the RoHS Directive and RoHS II’s strict mandate,
in combination with the WEEE Directive, manifest the challenges of the regulatory commons. Collectively, the RoHS and
WEEE Directives reduce the sense of social need in regulatory
actors charged with their enforcement.
In the United States, RCRA was enacted in 1976 to oversee
creation and disposal of waste.85 In pertinent part, RCRA exempts the export of potentially hazardous e-waste from any export controls to other countries by claiming it is intended for
recycling.86 Additionally, RCRA states that equipment with the
glass components of CRTs because there is no suitable alternative. Council
Directive 2011/65, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 5 (EU) (delineating the scope of
products affected by the RoHS Directive, which does not include devices with
medical or military applications). See also Directive 2002/95/EC, supra note
20, art. 4.
81. U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN, RoHS: Restriction of the use of
Certain
Hazardous
Substances,
EXPORT.GOV,
http://export.gov/europeanunion/weeerohs/rohsinformation/index.asp
(last
updated May 16, 2013).
82. The original RoHS Directive only applied to several categories of electrical and electronic equipment, such as household appliances and consumer
equipment. Press Release, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Environment: Fewer Risks
from Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (July 20,
2011) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-912_en.htm.
83. Memorandum from the European Commission, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Questions and Answers on the Revised Directive on Restrictions of Certain
Dangerous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) (Dec.
3, 2008) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08763_en.htm. RoHS II also promotes better compliance with the new REACH
legislation (The Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals), which was promulgated in 2006 for the marketing of products in
the EU. Press Release, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 82.
84. The RoHS Directive has led to more investment by manufacturers into
research and development in order to develop new, cleaner designs and manufacturing techniques, and to clean up devices sold worldwide. Kutz, supra
note 11, at 328. See also Sachs, supra note 72, at 93-94.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (1976), supra note 21.
86. Nisha Thakker, India’s Toxic Landfills: A Dumping Ground for the
World’s Electronic Waste, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 58, 60 (2006).
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“potential for reuse” is not waste, so many electronic products
at the end of their usable life cycle are not classified as “waste”
and are therefore excluded from the RCRA regulation.87 The
reach of RCRA is further limited by the EPA’s narrow definition of “hazardous.”88 Additionally, RCRA only covers materials
that emit dangerous chemicals during their use, so electronics
and harmful e-waste are generally excluded, 89 even though
they harm human and environmental health after the end of
their life cycle.
Unfortunately, a 2004 gathering convened by the EPA further reinforced the fact that RCRA can no longer control today’s overwhelming, and ever increasing, e-waste stream,90 a
fact which could not have been anticipated at the time RCRA
was enacted. To date, there is no nationwide e-waste recycling
or safe disposal law in the United States.91 Even if RCRA were
fully relevant, it is undermined by conflicting overlap with EPA
regulations. For example, RCRA is only enforced against large
businesses, not private consumers and small businesses. 92
87. Robert Tonetti, EPA Office of Solid Waste, EPA’s Regulatory Program
for
“E-Waste”
(Oct.
2007),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/materials/ecycling/docs/e-wasteregs.pdf.
88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8.
89. Even though the EPA now considers CRT computer monitors to be
hazardous, for many years CRT computer monitors were not registered on
Toxicity Characteristic Leachate Procedure (“TCLP”) lead toxicity tests.
Courtney, supra note 76, at 205-06.
90. OFFICE OF TECH. POL’Y, U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, RECYCLING TECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS: AN OVERVIEW OF E-WASTE POLICY ISSUES 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd57/recycling/intro.pdf.
The
National
Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (“NESPI”) brought stakeholders
in waste disposal together, including state and local governments, recyclers,
and environmental organizations. NESPI recognized the need for a national
law to better manage waste but no consensus has been reached on a financing method for such regulation.
91. Mark Anderson, Electronics Waste Programs Ineffective in Most U.S.
States, INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (Sept. 11,
2013),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/environment/electronics-wasteprograms-ineffective-in-most-us-states. In 2010, the EPA partnered with the
United Nations’ StEP Initiative and executed a cooperative agreement in
November 2010. Cleaning Up Electronic Waste (E-Waste), ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oiamount/toxics/ewaste/indexuew.html#national (last updated Dec. 16, 2013).
92. See 40 C.F.R §261.4(b)(1) (2010) (exclusion for household waste); 40
C.F.R. §261.5(f)(3) (2010) (conditional exclusion for companies that produce
less than 100 kilograms of hazardous waste per month). See also Sachs, supra
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RCRA “has exempted more and more toxic wastes simply because they allegedly destined for recycling operations”93 or to
other economically challenged institutions that take these
wastes in the guise of “donations.”94 Organizations that take
public donations like Goodwill and the Salvation Army are reluctant to accept discarded computers because of high disposal
costs. 95 Taken together, the loopholes present in RCRA enforcement manifest regulatory fragmentation in e-waste control.
Thus, this Note proposes that global regulators may improve
the effectiveness of environmental laws by adopting the lessons
of the regulatory commons to create economic incentives for ewaste producers, recyclers, and consumers alike, while enabling states, especially in the developing world, to better protect human and environmental safety. In the particular context
of the growing e-waste stream, this Note suggests that, while
counterintuitive at first glance, decentralization may be a better approach to effectively promoting human and environmental health.
II. THE PARADOX OF THE REGULATORY COMMONS
A. The Classic Tragedy of the Commons: The Regulatory Commons
The regulatory commons is a variation on the classic paradigm of the tragedy of the commons. In the tragedy of the
commons, rational, individual actors overuse a resource that no
one individual owns or controls, resulting in the destruction of
each individual’s long-term interest.96 This overused resource is
note 72, at 58 (noting that U.S. households produce over 1.6 million tons of
hazardous waste annually).
93. Thakker, supra note 86, at 60 (citing a 2002 report from BAN).
94. Manasvini Krishna & Pratiksha Kulshrestha, The Toxic Belt: Perspectives on E-Waste Dumping in Developing Nations, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 71, 88 (2008). E-waste is dumped in the guise of “donations” on developing countries that lack the financial resources to oversee proper disposal. The
Indian embassy in the United States even encourages donations of old computers to schools run by the Indian government.
95. Heather L. Drayton, Economics of Electronic Waste Disposal Regulations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149, 159 (2007).
96. Buzbee is the first to engage in serious exploration of the existence of
the “regulatory commons.” See Buzbee, supra note 25. Other legal scholars
have only referenced the concept in passing. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Vot-
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called a “fugitive resource” and each actor uses that resource in
a way that most immediately benefits him or herself.97 In the
long run, the actors in the tragedy of the commons overuse and
deplete the particular resource. 98 The traditional solution, in
theory, is to privatize property by creating property rights so
that individual actors can better manage externalities, share
information, and reduce transaction costs.99
The regulatory commons centers on regulation itself, also
known as the “regulatory opportunity,” as the overused resource, in lieu of some natural resource that is vulnerable to
depletion.100 Whereas the tragedy of the commons assumes that
the actor is a rational individual motivated by monetary interests, the regulatory commons assumes that the government
actor is not only motivated by monetary interests but also by
electoral, ideological, and political interests.101 Such symptoms

ing, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert Nelson’s
“Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 896-97 (1999) (noting that local governments tend to overregulate and that the Takings Clause
of the U.S. Constitution deters “local governments [from] devolv[ing] into a
kind of regulatory commons, in which each knows that its behavior may be
harmful to the larger area, but none has the incentive to mend its ways on its
own”); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46
DUKE L.J. 931, 985 (1997) (noting that any legal government system is akin
to “a kind of regulatory commons, where effective action is dependent upon
alliances of groups overcoming collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to respond.”).
97. See generally H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954), reprinted in JOHN
A. BADEN & DOUGLAS S. NOONAN, MANAGING THE COMMONS 17 (2d ed. 1998);
Hardin, supra note 27.
98. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990).
99. Completely privatized rights in a resource prone to depletion, however,
still rely on robust legal frameworks to maintain and enforce those rights
through judicial and regulatory regimes. They also introduce new costs of
creating and policing the private property regime and the tradeoff with a
community property system. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons,
Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 332-35 (1992) (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers &
Proc. 1967)).
100. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 22.
101. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991). See also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A.
Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. ECON. 103, 108 (1990) (dis-
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are already present in laws aimed to manage such varied resources as aquaculture,102 urban sprawl,103 global warming,104
and bioengineered foods.105 For instance, aquaculture involves
an industry where conflicting regulation over harvesters of
ocean and river resources creates a state in which individual
fishers are unable to privatize property and consequently are
unable to exclude other fishers from taking the resource.106
Overuse of the regulatory opportunity in the regulatory
commons poses a range of legal and societal problems.107 Consider, for example, the problem of “jurisdictional mismatch.”108
When no regulator has primacy over other regulators of the
regulated activity (such as the lack of a central government exerting power over local governments and administrative agencies), regulators experience mass political inattention and actually neglect the underlying problem.109 Additionally, “regulacussing how legislators’ ideology is “the most potent explanatory variable”
used in evaluating legislators’ actions).
102. On a domestic level, in the United States, there is no clear primary
regulator. Jurisdiction is shared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Food and Drug Administration, as well as state and local fisheries and wildlife agencies. See Erin R. Englebrecht, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circumvent the Regulatory Net of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1199-1207 (2002).
103. Again, on a domestic level in the United States, urban sprawl continues to be a problem but various forms of political action on the state level
have not been effective in addressing the issue. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee,
Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 509 (2000).
104. The United States remains the only signatory of the Kyoto Protocol
that has not yet ratified the convention. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1,
37
I.L.M.
22
(1998),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Despite executive orders
such as the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives released in
2002, little has been done in the United States to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., President Bush Visits
CLIMATIC
DATA
CENTER
(Feb.
14,
2002),
NOAA,
NATIONAL
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/trends.html) (last updated Aug. 20, 2008).
105. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY AND PATRICIA HANSEN, BREEDING DISTRUST:
AN ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE REGULATION OF
PLANT-DERIVED GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2001).
106. See Englebrecht, supra note 102, at 1190-91 (defining aquaculture).
107. Buzbee, supra note 25.
108. See also Esty, supra note 30, at 1538.
109. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 30.
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tory fragmentation” arises from the lack of centralization and
the prevalence of loopholes in the existing but disconnected
regulations.110 Furthermore, existing regulation may “overlap”
or create conflicts among jurisdictions both geographically and
at different jurisdictional levels of regulation.111 Consequently,
regulators may experience a reduced perception of social urgency and are less able to recognize and respond to ineffective
regulations. 112 These challenges are more severe where the
government is either smaller or, in some cases, larger than the
underlying resource that is being overly regulated because the
poor fit exacerbates the mismatch between legal control and
the regulatory resource in question.113 A tendency to maintain
the status quo shapes behavior and suppresses change. 114
Moreover, government actors actually compete to attract or
keep businesses and offer regulatory ease as a carrot, resulting
in a race to the bottom, where each regulatory authority actually provides less protection than it would if it were acting independently.115

110. See Wiener, supra note 31, at 701-04.
111. James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (2000) (noting effects of overlapping
agencies in environmental laws).
112. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
29, 30 and 49-52 (1998).
113. Oceans represent an example where the government is smaller than
the resource that is threatened. At the same time, a particular resource may
be highly localized so that an expansive government may not effectively regulate it. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 25.
114. Interest groups often try to maintain the status quo, and act in reliance on misconceptions derived from mental shortcuts (the availability heuristic). See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 798-99 (3d ed.
2001). This can be seen in how United States government policy has allocated
public goods such as offshore oil reserves (drilling leases), radio and television
airwaves (FCC broadcast frequencies), the air (pollution rights), and various
oil and natural gas quotas. See Elizabeth S. Rolph, Government Allocation of
Property Rights: Who Gets What?, 3 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 45, 47-49
(1983).
115. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1221-24 (1992); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
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B. Application of the Regulatory Commons to Existing E-Waste
Regulation
The Basel Convention is a perfect example of regulatory
fragmentation. As of this writing, 179 nations had adopted the
Basel Convention, yet the United States is the only developed
country in the world that has not done so.116 Furthermore, the
United States is one of three nations worldwide to have signed
but not ratified the Convention.117 The other two countries are
Haiti and Afghanistan, but neither has the gravitas that the
United States carries in the global arena. 118 Moreover, the
United States is the biggest producer of waste and thus potentially the largest violator of the Basel Convention.119 In effect,
the United States’ signing but not ratifying the Basel Convention undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Basel
Convention in other countries. In fact, the United States used
its leverage as a signatory to weaken the Convention and prevent a complete ban on all exports of hazardous waste to developing nations. 120 At the same time, developing countries lack
sufficient institutional and legal frameworks to enforce obligations of multinational treaties or cannot do so effectively in collaboration with developed countries.121
As a result of regulatory fragmentation, the Basel Convention faces challenges of poor implementation and enforcement.122 Many Basel members claim that they have been unable to comply with the Basel Convention because of limited resources, lack of staff, poor training, low public awareness, and

116. Parties to the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION (May 5, 1992),
http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm.
117. Templeton, supra note 52, at 795.
118. Id.
119. China is the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, though the United States still consumes six times as much energy per capita as does China.
Kristi Heim, Can a Bold New “Eco-City” Clear the Air in China?, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at A18.
120. Templeton, supra note 52, at 794-95; THE DIGITAL DUMP, supra note 9.
121. Greenpeace claimed that the Basel Convention should be considered
criminal activity. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, THE BASEL BAN: A TRIUMPH FOR
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2012), available at http://www.ban.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/BP1_Sept2012Final_A4.pdf (noting that several African nations refused to sign the weakened Convention and instead preferred
to create their own treaty banning the import of hazardous waste to Africa).
122. Schmidt, supra note 62, at 98.
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porous border controls.123 Unsurprisingly, with the exception of
the United States, countries with the most violations—namely
of the restrictions on export of hazardous wastes—are poorer
and have fewer resources. Thus, they are more vulnerable to
illegal e-waste dumping and to toxic waste that is imported
under the false pretext of recycling.124 At least one-third of the
Basel Convention’s members cannot enforce their treaty obligations due to a complete inability to prevent illegal waste imports. 125 Therefore, in 1995 the global community worked to
boost the Basel Convention’s effectiveness by seeking to adopt
the Basel Ban Amendment, which would place a complete ban
on the export of hazardous wastes from wealthy OECD countries to poor non-OECD countries.126
Nevertheless, as in the case of the Basel Convention, the Basel Ban Amendment represents another example of regulatory
fragmentation. The Basel Ban Amendment’s status has been
severely eroded by the United States, which has not only failed
to ratify the Basel Ban Amendment, but also worked to reverse
it. 127 Admittedly, to date, many Basel Convention members
have adopted the Basel Ban Amendment, including EU countries that have joined together under independent EU initiatives meant to address hazardous waste exports and e-waste
issues, such as the WEEE Directive. 128 Nevertheless, at the
same time, the Basel Ban Amendment may hurt developing
countries that currently trade in e-waste by reducing these
countries’ access to affordable electronics, deepening the digital

123. Id. at 101.
124. Id.
125. Id. (noting that countries claim, as causes for noncompliance, “a lack of
resources, training, staff, expertise, and public awareness, … [and] lax border
controls.”).
126. See Basel Convention Ban Amendment, supra note 18.
127. BASEL ACTION NETWORK, THE BASEL BAN AMENDMENT: ENTRY INTO
FORCE = NOW! (2007), available at http://ban.org/library/BP4_09_07.pdf (explaining that many countries need to ratify the Basel Ban Amendment for it
to take effect, how e-waste policies of the United States and Canada are inadequate and led to social injustice against developing nations, and that the
United States and Canada actively oppose the Basel Ban Amendment).
128. Templeton, supra note 52, at 795 (noting that France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom have adopted the Basel Ban Amendment).
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divide between developing and developed countries. 129 Furthermore, the Basel Ban Amendment only prohibits the export
of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries and does not prevent the export of clean electronics.130 Therefore, the effectiveness of the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment
are undermined by the very regulatory fragmentation that they
created.
Other examples of the challenges of the regulatory commons—regulatory fragmentation and overlap—can be seen in
the EU’s legislation regarding e-waste disposal. Inconsistencies
among various member states’ regulations embody the concept
of regulatory fragmentation while also creating new transaction costs.131 For instance, a key weakness of the WEEE Directive is the resulting costs incurred by their manufacturers in
recycling individual devices and tracking quantities of returned
goods. 132 Similarly, the RoHS Directive actually causes electronics manufacturers to make products of an inferior quality
by substituting less effective component parts so as to abide by
the ban on restricted substances.133 The RoHS Directive also
hurts the public by forcing manufacturers to rely on underdeveloped or untested technologies and materials, which may be
unreliable or even more harmful to the environment and public
health than the banned substances.134 These effects exacerbate
the e-waste problem by encouraging manufacturers to opt for
collective recycling instead of actively managing the e-waste
that they produce. 135 Faced with such a complex regulatory
129. Id. at 796 (noting that if the United States were to ratify the Basel
Convention, such action would influence countries such as Canada and Australia to follow suit).
130. Id.
131. See Pak, supra note 74, at 261.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 264-65 (noting that manufacturers originally chose to use the
banned substances because they were best suited for their particular purposes, and that substitute materials would not have provided the same results).
134. See Commission Decision 2005/618, 2005 O.J. (L 214) 65, para. (1),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0618:EN:NOT
(amending Directive 2002/95/EC to allow for “certain concentration values” of
banned substances). See also Pak, supra note 74, at 264-66 (noting that restrictions on lead caused the formation of “tin whiskers,” which can cause
failures in electrical circuits and indirectly led to the shutdown of a nuclear
power plant in Connecticut in 2005).
135. Id. at 262.
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framework, EU manufacturers are forced to export their ewaste overseas in order to avoid compliance with EU regulations.136
Also at play in relation to the WEEE Directive are the “race
to the bottom” effects of the regulatory commons. 137 For instance, China is a popular importing nation for WEEE countries because of its cheap labor and low environmental standards. 138 Taken a step further, the race to the bottom effects of
the regulatory commons actually endow China with a competitive economic advantage at the cost of environmental and
health risks. The WEEE Directive also allows member states to
place “collective” responsibility on industries rather than “individual” responsibility on each manufacturer, so that manufacturers do not actually manage the recycling and disposal costs
of their own products.139 Additionally, the WEEE Directive allows manufacturers to pay a flat fee to recycle, so manufacturers have little incentive to design electronics in ways that minimize use of harmful materials, that have a longer usable life,
or that allow them to be disposed of or recycled more easily.140
Furthermore, the WEEE Directive only sets minimum re136. Article 6 of the WEEE Directive permits manufacturers to export ewaste outside of the European Union as long they can demonstrate that the
receiving importer will process e-waste in compliance with the WEEE’s
standards. Council Directive 2002/96, supra note 74, art. 6.
137. See Revesz, supra note 115; Engel, supra note 115. A “race to the bottom” results when competition leads each regulatory authority to provide less
protection than it would if each acted independently.
138. A study demonstrates that the cost of recycling a computer is “approximately US$0.38 per pound in the United States, but only US$0.15 to
US$0.30 per pound overseas,” including all transportation and handling
costs. Catherine K. Lin, Linan Yan & Andrew N. Davis, Globalization, Extended Producer Responsibility and the Problem of Discarded Computers in
China: An Exploratory Proposal for Environmental Protection, 14 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 525, 533 (2002).
139. “Individual” responsibility refers to a situation in which manufacturers
manage products they actually produce, whereas “collective” responsibility
refers to a situation in which all manufacturers within an industry must collectively manage all e-waste, regardless of whether it arises from a product
that a particular manufacturer produced. Council Directive 2002/96, supra
note 74, art. 8.
140. Article 8 of the WEEE Directive allows manufacturers to use collective
e-waste management systems and establish common funds that pay a thirdparty to manage the disposal and recycling of used electronics returned by
the public. Id.
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quirements and allows all twenty-eight member states141 individual autonomy in establishing additional mandates. 142 Although the WEEE Recast Directive seeks to harmonize registration, it fails to prescribe labeling requirements and allows EU
Member States great leeway in establishing what information
must be provided for the proper disposal of their products.143
Thus, in the regulatory commons, competing governments implement policies in a defensive manner rather than with wellreasoned planning.144
Similarly, the regulatory commons’ jurisdictional mismatch
also cripples current U.S. law on both a domestic and international level. On the federal level, the EPA has been unable to
carry out aggressive regulatory controls to implement RCRA.145
A report by the EPA further underscores that, to date, the
United States has not adopted federal regulations to specifically handle domestic management or export of e-waste.146 At the
same time, on the state level, the presence of various forms of
legislation results in overlap and creates conflicting waste regulation schemes.147 These regulations can best be characterized
as a “patchwork” of inconsistent and often counterproductive
policies.148 In fact, nearly all types of e-waste are freely exported from the United States; the EPA only maintains narrow

141. WEEE
Member
State
Contacts,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/contacts_en.htm (last updated
Oct. 2012).
142. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community art. 176, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/12002E_EN.pdf.
143. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM.’S INT’L TRADE ADMIN, supra note 73.
144. Esty, supra note 30, at 1560.
145. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 2.
146. See Regulations/Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/waste/conserve/materials/ecycling/rules.htm (last updated
Nov. 7, 2013); Existing environmental regulations are intended to limit the
pollution created by manufacturing and neglect externalities incurred past
the products’ end-of-life cycle. See Sachs, supra note 72, at 57-58 (stating that
U.S. regulations are focused on the release of Volatile Organic Compounds
(“VOCs”) during manufacturing, but not of finished products that release
VOCs during use or upon disposal).
147. See generally Brief Comparison of State Laws on Electronics Recycling,
ELECTRONICS TAKE BACK COALITION, http://www.electronicstakeback.com/wpcontent/uploads/Compare_state_laws_chart.pdf (last updated Sept. 19, 2013).
148. Drayton, supra note 95, at 166.
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control over CRTs.149 The EPA’s CRT rule, introduced in 2006,
requires exporters to notify the EPA of their expected exports
of CRTs and to acquire consent of importing countries if CRTs
are to be recycled overseas.150 Nevertheless, exporters can easily get around the law by intentionally mislabeling shipments of
CRTs to avoid regulation.151
Moreover, existing environmental legislation also embodies
jurisdictional mismatch by creating conflicts with WTO legislation because both attempt to regulate e-waste. 152 For instance,
there are conflicts between the WTO and the Basel Convention
where two countries are both members of the WTO, but only
one is a Basel Convention Party.153 Such conflicts may revolve
around whether waste regulated by the Basel Convention is a
“product” as defined by the WTO, if complying with the Basel
Convention would violate the WTO’s Most Favored Nation
Treatment, or if a trade restriction under the Basel Convention
could be justified as an exception to the WTO’s laws.154 A key
source of contention is Article I of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”); it states that all rules, advantages,
or privileges granted by any WTO member for the import and
export of any product originating in or destined for any other
149. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 6-7.
150. 40 C.F.R § 261.39(a)(5) (2007) (Conditional Exclusion for Used, Broken
Cathode Ray Tubes (“CRTs”) and Processed CRT Glass Undergoing Recycling). See also Regulation of Cathode Ray Tubes, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/recycling/electron/index.htm (last
updated May 17, 2013); Export Requirements for Cathode Ray Tubes, U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/international/crts/index.htm (last updated
Dec. 21, 2012).
151. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 6-7, 23-31.
The GAO found in its August 2008 evaluation that violations of the CRT rule
continued to be “widespread” after the EPA adopted the CRT rule. Fortythree U.S.-based electronic recyclers did not comply with the CRT rule when
transacting with undercover GAO representatives acting as fictitious Asian
buyers.
152. PAUL P. APPASAMY, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS
182
(2006),
available
at
http://www.mse.ac.in/Trade/pdf/Compendium%20Part%20B/5.%20PPA-chemconven(2.4.07).pdf.
153. WTO regulation applies to “products” and could likely apply to wastes
covered by the Basel Convention because they are “‘moveable items placed in
international commerce,” e.g., for recycling. Id.
154. Id. at 183-84.

1276

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

country must be given “immediately and unconditionally” to a
like product originating in or destined for the territory of all
other WTO members.155 This represents potential trade conflict
and can give rise to challenges at the WTO if a country that is
both a party to the Basel Convention and a member of the
WTO bans the import and export of hazardous e-waste to and
from a country that is a WTO member but is not a party to the
Basel Convention.156 Under the Most Favored Nation Clause in
Article I of the GATT, a country that is not a party to the Basel
Convention could bring a dispute in WTO courts that the Basel
Convention unfairly favors another country that is trading ewaste, based on the claim that the nonparty country trades
products that are “like product” vis-à-vis e-waste.157 Given such
conflicts, harmful e-waste continues to escape control of both
the Basel Convention and the GATT regulatory systems and
continues to harm the developing countries to which it is exported.
III. RECONCILING THE REGULATORY COMMONS OF E-WASTE
REGULATION
Global e-waste regulations manifest the challenges present in
the regulatory commons, i.e., jurisdictional mismatch, regulatory fragmentation, overlap, and regulators’ reduced perception
of social need. These regulations would benefit from implementing effective solutions to reconcile the regulatory commons
paradox and more effectively manage e-waste. Analyzing ewaste regulation through the lens of the regulatory commons,
one can see that government actors are both the cause and the
solution to the problem.158 On the one hand, government actors
cannot claim ownership credit over regulations in the way that
a private actor could patent a particular regulation as innova-

155. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
156. Id.
157. APPASAMY, supra note 152, at 184.
158. Information, its availability, and various beliefs affect how people attribute and perceive causes of underlying problems. MILES HEWSTONE, FRANK
D. FINCHAM, AND JONATHAN FOSTER, PSYCHOLOGY 368-74 (2005). See also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 114

2014]

E-WASTE

1277

tive and gain an early-mover advantage in the market.159 On
the other hand, government actors can help resolve the paradox of the regulatory commons by unleashing market-based
forces. 160
First, a possible solution to the problem of the regulatory
commons requires a particular government actor to rise as a
prominent regulatory leader. 161 By decreasing the number of
potential regulators or increasing the significance of an existing regulator, the system creates a hierarchy of regulatory bodies.162 Such a hierarchy would better allocate responsibility so
that regulatory bodies can share responsibility, incentivize
regulatory action, and avoid regulatory fragmentation and
overlap.163
Second, implementing an Open Method of Coordination
(“OMC”) system could help overcome the challenge of regulatory fragmentation that is present in the regulatory commons.164
The OMC is a legal framework created at the Lisbon European
Council in 2000 to improve competitiveness for employment
opportunities and social cohesion among the EU member
states. 165 The OMC provides for a feedback and adjustment
process that emphasizes “mutual correction, not uniformity.”166
Experts across a broad spectrum of fields, drawn from member
states, come together in a panel to evaluate and disseminate
159. See generally MORRIS FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989) (noting that regulators’ ability to
claim credit is diluted). James Madison also made a similar finding that reputation and credit are “diminished in proportion to the number which is to
share in the praise or blame.” Randall Strahan, Personal Motives, Constitutional Forms, and the Public Good: Madison on Political Leadership, in JAMES
MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT 69 (Samuel Kernell ed.,
2003).
160. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 6.
161. Id. at 49-51.
162. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297
(1999).
163. Id. (arguing that creating hierarchies helps overcome regulatory inaction and regulatory fragmentation).
164. Buzbee, supra note 25, at 61.
165. Maria Joao Rodrigues, The Open Method of Coordination: A New Governance Tool, 2-3 EUROPA/EUROPE 96 (2001).
166. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and
US, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 694 (Karl-Heinz
Ladeur ed., 2004).
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information about each member state’s regulatory strategies.167
As such, the initiative encourages planning, comparison, and
coordination of policies168 and helps to improve social cohesion
across the European nation-states.169 The OMC has been expanded to other areas of regulation170 and may be a good solution to resolving problems in e-waste regulation.
Third, the problems of the regulatory commons can also be
resolved by a shift in power from government actors to private
business actors that lead entrepreneurial, decentralized units
and can act with a concentrated interest in regulating ewaste.171 The promotion of a decentralization approach toward
experimentation and information dissemination is commonly
known as “democratic experimentalism.”172 Here, decentralized
actors can be just as prominent as central government actors
and can reinforce information sharing. 173 Unlike regulatory
bodies, which have a poor sense of the pressing depletion of the
regulatory opportunity, decentralized business actors are more
flexible in their behaviors.174 Furthermore, private sector businesses are empowered with managerial autonomy and liaison
arrangements, placing them in a better position to counteract
overregulation. By their very nature, private sector businesses
are focused on sharing profits and are not subject to the same
sense of transparency and accountability to an electorate or
constituency, as regulators often are. 175 Thus, democratic experimentalism fosters information sharing and reinforces de167. Id.
168. Jos Berghman & Kieke G.H. Okma, The Method of Open Coordination: Open Procedures or Closed Circuit? Social Policy Making Between
Science and Politics, 4 EUR. J. SOC. SEC. 331 (2002) (highlighting the advantages of the open method of coordination).
169. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 166, at 694-95.
170. Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping With the Challenges of Diversity, 4 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 645, 652-56 (2002).
171. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (noting how design of legal institutions can be modeled after that of business institutions to benefit from
decentralized units). See, e.g., HANS WISSEMA, UNIT MANAGEMENT:
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND COORDINATION IN THE DECENTRALISED FIRM 11-12
(1992) (stating that fast changing markets need “an increase in ‘entrepreneurial density’” within firms).
172. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 171.
173. Id. at 354-56.
174. See generally id. at 368-69.
175. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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centralized autonomy in order to overcome the challenges
posed by the regulatory commons.176
Collectively, these solutions will help achieve the goals intended by the current overabundance of e-waste regulations.177
By providing for a clear delineation of authoritative hierarchy
and responsibilities, the creation of an OMC system, and the
promotion of democratic experimentalism, regulators can overcome regulatory fragmentation, reconcile conflicts from overlapping regulations and jurisdictional mismatch, and prevent
political inattention. In this way, regulators, who created the
problem of the regulatory commons in the first place, can foster
regulatory frameworks that overcome collective action problems in the regulatory commons.178
CONCLUSION
To effectively overcome the challenges of the regulatory
commons, international regulation of e-waste should shift the
burden from weak international entities to more authoritative
individuals and better engage actors to increase awareness via
democratic experimentalism. Japan’s SHAR system provides a
model that stands out for its simplicity and effectiveness. Implemented in 2001, the SHAR system distributes e-waste recycling responsibilities among four stakeholders: producers, consumers, retailers, and the government.179 SHAR mandates that
consumers must dispose of bulky electrical and electronic
products such as televisions, refrigerators, washing machines,
and air conditioners at designated collection locations maintained by large appliance retailers and local government agencies. 180 Manufacturers are divided into two groups. 181 Within
each group, manufacturers collaborate to establish and operate

176. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 171, cited in Buzbee, supra note 25, at 59.
177. Id. at 24.
178. Id.
179. Lin et al., supra note 26, 541-42 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Group A includes Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Toshiba
Corp., to name a few prominent manufacturers. Group B includes Hitachi,
Ltd., Sanyo Electric Co, Ltd, Sharp Corp, Sony Corp, Fujitsu General Ltd.,
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. Kiyoshi Ueno, Current Status of Home Appliance
Recycling in Japan, EPC NEWSLETTER, No. 18, available at
http://www.rezagos.com/descargas/Current%20Status%20of%20Home%20Ap
pliance%20Recycling%20in%20Japan.pdf.
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recycling plants and a network of collection centers. 182 Then,
other manufacturers and importers can contract with either
group to participate in the manufacturers’ takeback and recycling networks. 183 Under SHAR, manufacturers manage the
end-of-life processing of electronics after collection and develop
facilities and logistics chains necessary to transport and recycle
discarded electronics in an environmentally friendly way. 184
Meanwhile, consumers help finance SHAR’s collection and recycling mechanisms by paying disposal fees when dropping off
used electronic goods at the collection centers. 185 While the
WEEE Directive places complete end-of-life management responsibilities on manufacturers, Japan’s SHAR system is more
effective because it employs democratic experimentalism to
solve the problems of the regulatory commons.
Unlike most other developed nations, Japan’s SHAR system
effectively promotes public education regarding the e-waste issue and recruits consumers as responsible actors in delivering
e-waste and paying for its disposal.186 Because disposal fees differ based on the cost of recycling individual brands and waste
items, SHAR encourages consumers to change purchasing habits, buy less, and, when they do buy, to buy environmentally
friendly products.187 SHAR uses existing networks of retailers
and local governments to operate collection centers and more
182. Lin et al., supra note 26, at 542.
183. Id.
184. SHAR holds the largest electronics manufacturers responsible for
building the infrastructure and facilities necessary to process e-waste, while
smaller manufacturers must negotiate agreements to access these networks.
See INFORM, INC., Electric Appliance Recycling in Japan, 1 (2003), available at
http://informinc.org/japanepr.pdf. Inform, Inc. is a U.S.-based nonprofit that
produces short films to educate the public about the effects of human activity
on the environment and human health. This publication explains how Japan
enacted responsibility mandates for the disposal of electronic appliances.
185. Manufacturers set recycling fees for their own products and such fees
usually range from 2,400 to 4,600 yen, or US$23.50 to US$45. Pak, supra
note 74, at 275-78. Under SHAR, consumers pay two types of fees upon disposal of e-waste at collection centers: a collection fee to cover the cost of collection and a recycling fee to cover the cost of recycling a particular item. Id.
186. See id. Additionally, the EPA has found that most computer users are
unaware of the problems e-waste presents. TACHI KIUCHI ET AL., GLOBAL
FUTURES FOUNDATION, COMPUTERS, E-WASTE, AND PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP: IS
CALIFORNIA READY FOR THE CHALLENGE?
(2001),
available
at
http://infohouse.p2ric.org/ref/41/40164.htm.
187. Pak, supra note 74, at 275-78.
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proportionately allocates cost to consumers. 188 Furthermore,
unlike the WEEE Directive, SHAR also serves as a paradigm
for individual, producer-led takeback programs by requiring
manufacturers to manage the disposal and recycling of their
waste and enabling them to determine disposal costs for these
products.189
It could be argued that by mandating that consumers both
physically dispose of used electronics at specified collection centers and pay end-of-life fees, Japan’s e-waste policies may incentivize some individuals to illegally dump unwanted electronics rather than obey the regulations.190 For example, one
month after SHAR became effective, the rate of illegal e-waste
dumping in Japan increased by 25%.191 Coordinating such collection systems and determining individual producers’ costs
can also be expensive.192 Nevertheless, Japan’s overall success
demonstrates that the assignment of individual costs in ewaste regulation can be done effectively. Even if the collective
system proves too arduous for certain manufacturers, these
manufacturers still have the option to implement their own individual takeback programs, for instance, as Panasonic has
done in its home country, Japan, and in many countries outside
Japan.193 Consumers can also fund transactional expenses as-

188. INFORM, INC., supra note 184 (explaining how Japan’s postal service
provides ubiquitous and easily accessible collection infrastructure). Additionally, manufacturers are also incentivized to create more environmentally
sound electronics with longer product lives. See Pak, supra note 74, at 272-73.
189. Pak, supra note 74, at 272-73.
190. Lin et al., supra note 26, at 542.
191. Id.
192. Hannah G. Elisha, Addressing the E-Waste Crisis: The Need for Comprehensive Federal E-Waste Regulation Within the U.S., 14 CHAP. L. REV. 195,
231 (2010) (stating the opinion of SHAR’s critics).
193. Panasonic has set up producer takeback programs under the Electronic
Manufacturers Recycling Management Company in collaboration with Toshiba and Sharp in the United States, and similar programs in Germany and
Australia. Environment: Recovery of Resources (Used Product Recycling),
PANASONIC,
http://www.panasonic.net/sustainability/en/eco/resources_recycling/recovery/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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sociated with determining and assigning individual product
costs by adapting their purchasing behavior. Thus, international environmental regulation can be decentralized in order
to provide economic incentives for e-waste producers, recyclers,
and consumers alike, while enabling states to better promote
human health and environmental safety.
As a next step, rather than signing onto another multilateral
treaty, government authorities and private actors should aim
to implement a decentralized model analogous to that of Japan’s SHAR system. Using reduction of e-waste and illegal exports as a measure of experimental success, public and private
parties will benefit if they can replicate and adopt such a model
on a global scale.
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